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ABSTRACT
This work facilitates ensuring fairness of machine learning in the
real world by decoupling fairness considerations in compound de-
cisions. In particular, this work studies how fairness propagates
through a compound decision-making processes, which we call a
pipeline. Prior work in algorithmic fairness only focuses on fair-
ness with respect to one decision. However, many decision-making
processes require more than one decision. For instance, hiring is
at least a two stage model: deciding who to interview from the
applicant pool and then deciding who to hire from the interview
pool. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that the composition of fair
components may not guarantee a fair pipeline under a (1+ ε)-equal
opportunity definition of fair. However, we identify circumstances
that do provide that guarantee. We also propose numerous direc-
tions for future work on more general compound machine learning
decisions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Automated-decision making saves time and is implicitly assumed
to prevent human bias. However, such automated decisions may
unfortunately lead to unfair outcomes. Until recently, the use of
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automated-decision making has been largely unchecked. In pursuit
of this goal, the first question that needs to be addressed is what
“fairness" itself actually means and how to quantify it. A meta-
analysis of the current literature indicates there are a multitude of
inequivalent applications of the term, and consequently metrics.
See, for example, [3] (which is based off of definitions in the seminal
paper, [2]) for a general framework that encompasses notions of
individual fairness and group fairness (“non-discrimination”).
In this paper, we are particularly interested in how effects of
bias compound in decision-making pipelines. While prior work in
algorithmic fairness has focused on fairness of one decision, it is not
immediately clear how fairness propagates throughout a compound
decision making process. Complicated decisions usually require
more than one decision. For example, a hiring process may include
two decisions: from an applicant pool, one first decides who gets
an interview, and the final hiring decision is made from the pool
of interviewees. Although this is a relatively simple two-decision
example, one can imagine a recursive-like compound decision-
process where the outcome of one decision affects another and vice
versa. For instance, perhaps to be brought in for an interview at
company A, working for company B helps greatly, but working for
company A also helps an applicant greatly to get an interview at
company B.
We ask the following questions:
(1) Can a decision at point j in a decision pipeline correct for
unfairness at point i < j?
(2) Howmuch fairness from point i is preserved in later points
in the pipeline?
(3) More specifically, how does the fairness from each stage
contribute to the fairness of the final decision?
Our contribution to the algorithmic fairness field is to highlight
the need to study compound decision making processes by study-
ing how composability and fairness interact. We emphasize that
pipelines are useful to study because they decouple the intermedi-
ate decisions since there may be completely different parties with
varying goals and mechanisms responsible for each decision. Per-
haps suprisingly, even in the most basic example of a two-stage
pipeline, we show under a (1 + ε)-equal opportunity definition of
fair, the two stages cannot necessarily be combined as expected.
Finally, pipelines set the stage for a number of interesting questions
detailed in Section 4.1.
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2 FRAMEWORK
2.1 Pipelines
Definition 2.1 (Straight Pipeline). An n-stage (straight) pipeline
P(f ,д) on a set O is an ordered set of decision functions
F = { f1 : O → D1, f2 : O×D̂1 → D2, . . . , fT : O×DT−1 → DT }
where D̂t = Dkt × Dkt+1 × · · · × Dt−1 × Dt for 1 ≤ kt ≤ t for
t = 1, . . . ,T and rule functions
{д1 : D1 → {0, 1}, . . . ,дT−1 : DT−1 → {0, 1}}
where the final decision for x ∈ O is given by
P(f ,д)(x) :=
{
fˆT (x) дt ( fˆt (x)) = 1 ∀t ∈ [T − 1]
FAIL otherwise
where for x ∈ O , f̂1(x) = f1(x) and for t = 2, . . . ,T , fˆt (x) =
ft (x , f̂kt (x), fkt+1(x), . . . , f̂t (x)). We will say decision function ft
takes place at stage t of the pipeline for t = 1, . . . ,T .
To understand the above definition, note that a straight pipeline
P(f ,д) on a set O (for instance, applicants to a job) takes input
x ∈ O and applies a decision function on x . If the first decision
(f1(x)), on x is satisfactory (where satisfactory is determined by д1),
x is passed onto the next decision function and so on and so forth
until there are no more decisions to be made (reaching fT ) or an
intermediate stage declares an unsatisfactory decision (determined
by some дt ) at which point no further decisions shall be made. Each
subsequent decision function after the first may see some part of
the past decisions prior in the pipeline (how many decisions back
decision function ft can see back is determined by kt ).
We expect the following variations and restrictions to be com-
mon with illustrative examples below:
(1) Filtering pipeline. When each decision function ft is
binary, take дt (0) = 0 and дt (1) = 1, i.e., only the positive-
decision subset of previous stage gets passed on. In this
case, we may use the notation P(f ,д) in place of Pf for
concision.
(2) Cumulative decisions pipeline. Take kt ≤ i , i.e., the de-
cision at each stage agglomerates some score onto previous
stages’ decision scores, so that each stage’s decision can
depend on some of the previous decisions.
(3) Informed pipeline. Each stage of the pipeline has sum-
mary statistics about the outcome of previous stages. In
this paper, those statistics are implicit in the definition of
ft . In particular, our notation above, while sufficient for
this paper, is insufficient to study linked decisions in which
each decision reacts to statistics about the other.
The below diagram illustrates a two-stage pipeline, where the sec-
ond decision can see what happened in the first decision on a given
input:
x f1(x) (x , f1(x)) f2(x , f1(x))
P(f ,д)(x) = FAIL P(f ,д)(x) = fˆ2(x)
f1
д1(f1(x ))=0
д1(f1(x ))=1 f2
Example 2.2 (Hiring decisions as a two-stage filtering pipeline).
LetO be the applicant pool, f1 : O → D1 = {0, 1} the decision as to
who receives an interview, and f2 : O×D1 → D2 = {0, 1} the hiring
decision. Then Pf (x) = fˆ2(x) = f2(x , f1(x)) for all applicants x such
that f1(x) = 1 (i.e. for all applicants who receive an interview), and
0 (or FAIL) otherwise.
2.2 Fairness
As we have stated, there is no consensus in the literature on the def-
inition of fairness. However, there have been many recent proposed
definitions. For simplicity, in order to illustrate how fairness propa-
gates through a filtering pipeline, we will build on the definition of
equal opportunity found in [4].
Equal Opportunity. We consider the case of making a binary
decision Yˆ ∈ {0, 1} and measure fairness with respect to a protected
attributeA ∈ {0, 1} (such as age, gender, or race) and the true target
outcome Y ∈ {0, 1}, which captures if an individual is qualified or
not.
Definition 2.3. As defined in [4], a binary predictor Yˆ satisfies
equal opportunity with respect to A and Y if
Pr{Yˆ = 1|A = 0,Y = 1} = Pr{Yˆ = 1|A = 1,Y = 1}.
In other words, we make sure that the true positive rates are the
same across a protected attribute. We usually think of A = 0 as a
majority class.
(1 + ε)-Equal Opportunity. Equal opportunity may be far too
restrictive since it requires exact equality of two probabilities. In
addition, because our goal is to measure how fairness propagates
through a pipeline, we propose to quantify fairness relative to a
majority class with an ε factor. In fact, we propose a framework
that consists of boosting the minority class in order to correct for
existing bias. Therefore, we introduce the notion of (1 + ε)-equal
opportunity, which allows for compensation of inherent biases in
training data.
Definition 2.4 ((1 + ε)-equal opportunity). A binary predictor Yˆ
satisfies (1+ε)-equal opportunity with respect toA, Y , and majority
class A = 0 if
(1 + ε) Pr{Yˆ = 1|A = 0,Y = 1} ≤ Pr{Yˆ = 1|A = 1,Y = 1},
where ε ∈ [0, 1) can be any real number such that
(1 + ε) Pr{Yˆ = 1|A = 0,Y = 1} ∈ [0, 1].
This definition generalizes to more than one protected class in a
natural way: if A = {a1, . . . ,am } and am represents the majority
class, then Yˆ satisfies ((1+ε1), . . . , (1+εm ))-equal opportunity with
respect to A, Y , and am , if
(1 + εt ) Pr{Yˆ = 1|A = am ,Y = 1} ≤ Pr{Yˆ = 1|A = at ,Y = 1}
for t = i1, . . . ,m − 1.
That is, we make sure that the true positive rates in the protected
class are 1 + ε times the rates in the majority class. The factor of
(1+ε) could be determined, for example, by a Human-Resources pro-
fessional or lawyer in order to correct known bias, past or present,
whose mechanisms may not be fully understood. (The problem
of choosing ε properly is a much more difficult control problem,
possibly involving feedback, and is deferred to later work.)
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2.3 Why pipelines?
Examples. Wewill now illustrate the utility of studying pipelines
with a few examples. Many more examples have been identified in
[5].
(1) Hiring. Hiring for a job is at least a two-stage pipeline: (1)
determine who to interview out of an applicant pool and
(2) determine who to hire out of an interview pool. Hiring
is also an example of a filtering pipeline since only those
who have successfully got an interview are passed onto
the interview stage. This pipeline can also be an example
of a informed pipeline if the final stage gets information
about the racial, gender, and age make-up of the applicant
pool for instance.
(2) Criminal Justice. Getting parole can be thought of as a
three-stage pipeline: (1) compute a defendant’s risk assess-
ment score, (2) if the defendant is convicted, determine the
criminal’s sentencing, and (3) determine whether the crim-
inal gets parole. This pipeline is an example of a cumulative
decisions pipeline since the parole board has information
about the risk assessment score and sentencing.
(3) Mortgages Getting a mortgage for a home can be thought
of as a looping pipeline. An applicant’s FICO score is used
to determine whether they get a mortgage. However, an
applicant’s FICO score is affected by prior credit and loan
decisions, which also use the applicant’s FICO score.
In the following, we show that (under specific circumstances)
the fairness of a compound process can be guaranteed by making
each link in the pipeline fair. This has the desirable implication that
“global" fairness can be obtained via “local” fairness under these
specific circumstances. In future work, we aim to develop a more
general result that would guarantee fairness over the entire pipeline
while allowing for each organization making one of the decisions
in the pipeline to consider fairness only in its own decision.
3 RESULTS
For the rest of the paper, we will focus on two-stage pipelines whose
decision functions are binary decision functions, i.e., D1 = D2 =
{0, 1}. We will usually refer to such a decision function as a binary
predictor Yˆ .
3.1 Pipeline Fairness
Consider a two-stage pipeline with binary predictors f1 = Xˆ and
f2 = Yˆ where again we take A = 0 to be the majority class and
X and Y be the true target outcomes. Using the hiring scenario
from above, for example, Xˆ would represent the decision about
whether or not to interview a candidate and Yˆ would represent the
decision about whether or not to hire a candidate. If X = 1, then
the candidate is qualified to get an interview; likewise, a candidate
with Y = 1 is a good fit for the job.
We define the pipeline to be (1 + α)-equal opportunity fair if the
final decision is (1 + α)-equal opportunity fair:
(1 + α) Pr{Yˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 0} ≤ Pr{Yˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 1}.
Assuming
(1) (1 + ε) Pr{Xˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 0} ≤ Pr{Xˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 1},
a nontrivial assumption that looks something like (1 + ε)-
equal opportunity for the first stage in the pipeline.
(2) (1 + δ ) Pr{Yˆ = 1|Xˆ = 1,Y = 1,A = 0} ≤ Pr{Yˆ = 1|Xˆ =
1,Y = 1,A = 1}, that is, (1 + δ )-equal opportunity for the
second stage in the pipeline.
(3) Yˆ = 1 =⇒ Xˆ = 1.
See Section 2.3 for a discussion of these assumptions. Then, we
have that
(1 + ε)(1 + δ ) Pr{Yˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 0}
= (1 + ε)(1 + δ ) Pr{Yˆ = 1, Xˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 0}
= (1 + ε) Pr{Xˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 0}(1 + δ ) Pr{Yˆ = 1|Xˆ = 1,Y = 1,A = 0}
≤ Pr{Xˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 1} Pr{Yˆ = 1|Xˆ = 1,Y = 1,A = 1}
= Pr{Yˆ = 1, Xˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 1}
= Pr{Yˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 1}
Therefore,
(1 + ε)(1 + δ ) Pr{Yˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 0} ≤ Pr{Yˆ |Y = 1,A = 1},
so the pipeline is (1+ε)(1+δ ) = (1+ε+δ+o(ε+δ ))-equal opportunity
fair and hence fairness is multiplicative over each stage under the
above assumptions.
A Toy Example. To provide insight into how a (1+ε)-equal oppor-
tunity decision at different stages of the pipeline affect outcomes,
we give an example using the two-stage hiring model pipeline.
Suppose a company wishes to interview 20 people, and hire 2
of those 20. Assume 100 applicants apply, with 90 from a majority
group and 10 from a minority group. Also assume the proportion
of applicants qualified for the job are equal for both groups. For
this simple example, we make the strong assumption that we have
very good algorithms that choose only people qualified for the job,
and that there are enough qualified applicants for each scenario.
Define the interview, the first stage, as a (1+ε)-equal opportunity
decision, and the hiring, the second stage, as a (1 + δ ) decision.
Using the definitions from the above section with strict equality,
our decisions satisfy:
(1) (1 + ε) Pr{Xˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 0} = Pr{Xˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 1}
(2) (1 + δ ) Pr{Yˆ = 1|Xˆ = 1,Y = 1,A = 0} = Pr{Yˆ = 1|Xˆ =
1,Y = 1,A = 1}
Table 1 and Figure 1 provide a numerical table and visual of four
scenarios. Case one and two present a situation where a perceived
bias is accounted for at different stages in the pipeline. Case three
presents a scenario where an attempt to fix a bias is implemented
at stage one, but is counterbalanced at stage two, and case four
presents the reverse circumstance.
One observation of note is that if one wishes to implement a (1+
ε)-decision to fix a perceived bias, the final outcome is independent
of the stage at which the (1+ ε)-decision is made. Simulation shows
that the variance of the final decision is also independent of the
stage at which a decision is implemented.
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Table 1: Four Cases
Case: ε , δ Expected
majority
inter-
viewed
Expected
minority
inter-
viewed
Expected
majority
hired
Expected
minority
hired
1: 2, 0 15 5 1.5 0.5
2: 0, 2 18 2 1.5 0.5
3: 2, -.666 15 5 1.8 0.2
4: -.666, 2 19.28 .71 1.8 0.2
Figure 1
This may be important for future policy, as giving preference
to a minority group during the interview is perhaps more publicly
acceptable than giving higher preference tominorities during hiring.
Additionally, instead of giving preference to the minority group to
receivemore interviews from the current unbalanced applicant pool,
the same outcome can be achieved by recruiting more minority
applicants.
3.2 Where Difficulties Lie
Notice that, above we assume that fairness in the first stage of the
pipeline to mean (1 + ε) Pr{Xˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = 0} ≤ Pr{Xˆ = 1|Y =
1,A = 1} and fairness in the second stage to mean (1 + δ ) Pr{Yˆ =
1|Xˆ = 1,Y = 1,A = 0} ≤ Pr{Yˆ = 1|Xˆ = 1,Y = 1,A = 1}. Fairness
in stage two fits in the framework of equal opportunity since it’s a
statement about an applicant getting hired given that the applicant
is hiring-qualified and made it successfully through the first stage
of the pipeline. Unfortunately, the first stage “fairness” assumption
is a bit troublesome because it requires the first stage to make a
decision based on the quality measured in the last stage. In a real
world application, the first stage may be controlled by different
mechanisms or goals than the last stage. In the context of a pipeline
process where each portion is controlled by the same organization
(or perhaps the portions are controlled by two sub-entities of the
one organization), these assumptions make sense. However, there
are many scenarios where this assumption will not be met.
For an example, we return to the two-stage pipeline hiring ex-
ample where the first stage of the pipeline determines who gets
an interview and the second stage determines who gets hired. The
interview stage may only care about someone’s resume to deter-
mine if they should be granted an interview. However, it’s not hard
to imagine a case where a candidate is hiring qualified (Y = 1;
they have the skills for the interview and job) but is not interview
qualified (X = 0; their resume could be bad because they never
received guidance on creating a good resume). Therefore, the issue
seems to be with the specific ratio for i = 0, 1:
Pr{Xˆ = 1|X = 1,A = i}
Pr{Xˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = i} .
Ideally, we want these probabilities to be as close as possible so
that we can decouple the pipeline. If not, being fair in the interview
stage only based on interview qualifications and being fair in the
hiring stage may not result in a pipeline that is fair.
4 CONCLUSION
In this work, we formalized the notion of a compound decision
process called a pipeline, which is ubiquitous in domains like hir-
ing, criminal justice, and finance. A pipeline decouples the final
decision into intermediate decisions, which is important since al-
though each decision affects the final outcome, different processes
with different goals may be in charge of each intermediate stage.
Decoupling allows us to see how fairness in each stage contributes
to the fairness in the final decision.
We also modified the definition of equal opportunity to allow
boosting of the minority class and showed under what assumptions
of fairness on the intermediate stages of the pipeline result in an
overall fair pipeline according to this definition. In this case, the
fairness from each stage of the pipeline is in some sense independent
so that the entire pipeline has fairness factor given by the product.
On the other hand, we would like to point out if the first stage is
unfair, then the second stage cannot necessarily rectify the situation.
For example, if the first stage grants interviews to just one or two
from a minority class, then the second stage is limited to hiring
both of them, which will not result in overall fairness. Therefore, it
is important to get the first stage right.
4.1 Future Work
We hope that our work highlights the need and sets the stage
to understand compound decision making. We now give many
directions for future research.
Stability. In a straight pipeline, will a small amount of unfairness
or bias in the beginning turn into a large amount of unfairness at
the end?
Bias as pipeline stage. In our main hiring example above, we
composed two remedies to implicit bias. Alternatively, bias might
be analyzed as a pipeline stage with parameter ϵ of sign opposite
to the corresponding ϵ in the remedy stage.
Transparency. How transparent can a pipeline be? One method
to test is whether measuring transparency by qualitative input
influence [1] is cumulative, and how it differs by the type of pipeline.
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Does one need information at each stage, or is it sufficient to have
good information of only the final decision?
Variance and small pools. We can ask that the expected rate of
positive decisions for a subclass be (approximately) proportional
to that class’s presence in the population. But, as with reliable
randomized algorithms, we really want the outcomes to concentrate
at (or near) the expectation with high probability. If a protected class
is tiny, then small aberrations may cause an outcome far from the
mean, with relatively large probability. In the context of pipelines,
after asking whether means are preserved through pipelines, we
can ask whether concentration is preserved. As in the case with
randomized algorithms, it is sometimes appropriate to distort the
mean to preserve concentration.
Feedback loops. More generally, some situations involve many
interacting decisions, possibly with feedback loops. Under what
circumstances can each decision be made autonomously, with some
guarantee that the system will converge to meet some overall guar-
antee of fairness? For example, early in the days of long-distance
running, just after women were allowed to enter major marathons
without restriction, fewer women than men chose to do so at the
elite level. Some race organizers—on the assumption that the sport
should attract women and men equally—offered an equal total
purse (say, for the top ten spots) for each of the men’s and women’s
races and, since fewer women entered, those who did chased a
larger expected individual payout. Policies like these are designed
to lure more women elites the following year. What if the process
is decelerated, say, by offering a purse proportional to the square
root of the participation rate, e.g., with initial participation rates of
r0 : r1 given by 10:90, the purse is proportional to
√
r , so
√
.1:
√
.9,
which is 25:75? What if the process is accelerated, by offering a
purse proportional to 1/r , so 1/.1 : 1/.9, about 9:1, reversing the
participation ratio? Note that, for these types of incentives, Teither
class needs to be marked as protected, which may be desirable,
though the goal of equal participation must be assumed. Typically
(but depending on the strength of the economic signal to incentivize
future runners),
√
r has an attractive fixed point at 50:50 and 1/r
has a repulsive fixed point at 50:50. Under appropriate assumptions,
we can pose a purely mathematical question: What is the least
function д(r ) (or give a bound on д) that leads to an attractive fixed
point? By analogy with cryptography, can such systems (with or
without loops) be tolerant to a bounded number of unfair players?
Or bounded "total amount of unfairness," distributed among all the
players and not otherwise quantified or understood?
Definitions of fairness. To return to the elite runners example,
we may need refined definitions of fairness, say, "interim fairness,"
that captures increased year-over-year participation of an under-
represented class, and calls the improvement "interim fair" even
if the system has not yet converged to a fair state. As for hiring,
suppose a University department only hires faculty from a pool
of recent PhDs, which is unbalanced. If the hiring process selects
underrepresented faculty at a far higher rate than their presence
in the PhD pool, that should be deemed "interim fair" for some
purposes.
Different notions of fairness. Furthermore, we would like to un-
derstand how different definitions of fairness other than (1+ε)-equal
opportunity propagate through a pipeline.
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